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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Corey Richard Munoz appeals his judgment of conviction for felony 
possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces. Specifically, Munoz 
challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. 
Statement of the Facts 
Prior to trial, Munoz moved to suppress a baggie of marijuana he 
disclosed to law enforcement as well as statements he made admitting 
ownership of marijuana found in his vehicle. (R., pp.36-39.) 
At the suppression hearing Garden City Police Detective Jason Pietrzak 
testified that he and another officer, Detective Alec Sarrazolla, were looking for 
an individual named Darryl Marsh. (Tr., p.37, L.18 - p.38, L.lO.) Mr. Marsh was 
wanted on a felony probation violation warrant and had an outstanding felony 
eluding charge pending against him. (Tr., p.38, Ls.8-15.) The detectives had a 
physical description and a photo of Mr. Marsh, but neither were personally 
familiar with him. (Tr., p.38, L.24 - p.39, L.6; p.75, L.20 - p.76, L.6.) Detective 
Pietrzak testified that he and Detective Sarrazolla went to a trailer park where 
they believed Mr. Marsh was located and stopped and talked with the caretaker 
of the park. (Tr., p.38, L.18 - p.40, L.7.) The caretaker stated, after seeing the 
booking photo, that Mr. Marsh looked "familiar" and that he "probably lives" in the 
back of the trailer park. (Tr., p.39, L.20 - p. p.41, L.16.) Detective Pietrzak 
testified that he and Detective Sarrazolla decided to sit and wait in their 
unmarked police car. (Tr., p.41, Ls. 14-16.) 
Detective Pietrzak stated that they observed a vehicle, a green Geo, drive 
into the park with an individual in the front passenger's seat who looked like Mr. 
Marsh. (Tr., p.41, L.17 - p.42, L.21.) Detective Pietrzak testified that the vehicle 
passed within a few feet of the officers and that both he and Detective Sarrazolla 
believed the individual was Mr. Marsh. (Tr., p.42, Ls.9-21.) The detective stated 
that based on the physical description of the individual in the car and the physical 
description they had of Mr. Marsh that they believed the individual was Mr. 
Marsh. (Tr., p.43, Ls.8-13.) Detective Pietrzak testified that he and Detective 
Sarrazolla drove around to see where the vehicle had parked and ultimately 
returned to the entrance of the trailer park where the vehicle had entered. (Tr., 
p.42, L.22 - p.43, L.2.) Detective Pietrzak testified that they observed the Geo a 
second time, this time with the individual that looked like Mr. Marsh sitting in the 
back seat of the vehicle. (Tr., p.43, Ls.14-20.) 
Detective Pietrzak testified that they followed the vehicle out of the trailer 
park and then stopped it. (Tr., p.43, L.21 - p.44, L.17.) Detective Pietrzak stated 
that the basis for the stop was their belief that Mr. Marsh was inside the vehicle. 
(Tr., p.44, Ls.21-25.) Because of the warrant and charges pending against Mr. 
Marsh and the anticipation that Mr. Marsh would be armed, the stop was 
deemed "high risk." (Tr., p.45, L.21 - p.46, 1.7; p.57, L.21 - p.58, L.2.) The 
detective testified that pursuant to standard operating procedure for dealing with 
a "high r isk stop, each individual in the vehicle was immediately separated, 
placed in hand restraints, and patted down for weapons. (Tr., p.46, L.21 - p.48, 
L.16.) 
Detective Pietrzak stated that after the individuals in the car where 
separated and secured, the officers determined that the individual that they 
believed was Mr. Marsh was actually Charles Fitzerer. (Tr., p.47, Ls.2-14; p.58, 
Ls.6-23.) Detective Pietrzak testified that Mr. Fitzerer, when he told them his 
identity, also informed the detectives that he had an outstanding misdemeanor 
warrant. (Tr., p.48, Ls.17-23.) After the warrant was confirmed, Mr. Fitzerer was 
arrested. (Tr., p.49, Ls.17-23.) Detective Pietrzak testified that prior to 
confirming Mr. Fitzerer's identity he walked up to the Geo to make sure that 
everyone was out of the car. (Tr., p.49, Ls.10-16.) The detective stated when he 
did this he noticed on the front passenger side floorboard some marijuana in 
plain view from the street. (Tr., p.49, L.24 - p.50, L.22.) 
Detective Pietrzak testified that he did not remove the marijuana at that 
time because his focus was still on determining the identity of the person they 
believed was Mr. Marsh. (Tr., p.50, Ls.19-22.) The detective stated that after 
Mr. Fitzerer was arrested, he approached Munoz because he had been the one 
sitting in the front passenger's seat. (Tr., p.50, L.23 - p.51, L.8.) Detective 
Pietrzak stated that Munoz was not in handcuffs when he approached him and 
that the "high r isk stop was over. (Tr., p.51, Ls.15-17; p.58, L.19-24.) The 
detective testified that when he asked Munoz about the substance he observed 
in the vehicle, Munoz identified it as marijuana and said that it belonged to him. 
(Tr., p.52, Ls.6-10.) Detective Pietrzak said he asked Munoz if he had any more 
and that Munoz said he did and pulled a sandwich baggie full of marijuana from 
his pocket. (Tr., p.52, Ls.6-15.) Detective Pietrzak testified that he eventually 
removed the marijuana from the car. (Tr., p.54, Ls.2-7.) 
Munoz also testified at the suppression hearing. He acknowledged that 
the officers were looking for an individual named Darryl Marsh and that they 
suspected the individual in the back seat, Mr. Fitzerer, of being Mr. Marsh. (Tr,, 
p.13, Ls.9-20.) Munoz claimed, however, that he was not patted down and not 
searched until after his car was searched, that during that search of his person 
the officer pulled the marijuana from his pocket, and that the marijuana on his 
person was only one ounce, not three. (Tr., p.15, L.4 - p.16, L.20.) Munoz 
admitted that he was asked whether the marijuana in the car belonged to him, 
but he claimed that he did not respond to the question. (Tr., p.25, Ls.73-20.) 
On the basis of the testimony provided at the suppression hearing, Munoz 
argued that the stop of his vehicle was without reasonable justification and that 
the subsequent searches of the vehicle, as well as his person, were, therefore, 
impermissible. (R., pp.36-37.) Munoz argued that his admissions regarding the 
marijuana in the car and on his person were not voluntary, were the result of a 
custodial interrogation, and that, because he was not informed of his Miranda 
rights, were impermissible and should be suppressed. (R., p.37.) 
After considering both accounts the district court concluded Detective 
Pietrzak was more credible than Munoz. (R., p.51.) The district found the 
detective acted reasonably in stopping the defendant's vehicle on the basis of 
their belief that Mr. Fitzerer was Mr. Marsh. (R., p.51.) Additionally, the district 
court found law enforcement acted reasonably in removing the passengers from 
the vehicle out of a concern for officer safety (R., p.51-52) and that Detective 
Pietrzak observed the marijuana on the floorboard of Munoz's car in plain view 
(R., p.52). The court also made factual findings that Munoz was not handcuffed 
and not under arrest when he was "informally and briefly" asked about the 
marijuana found in the car. (R., p.52.) Moreover, the district court concluded 
that "the defendant chose to voluntarily answer the detective's questions and 
produce the marijuana" and that Munoz's Miranda protections were not 
implicated. (R., pp.52-53.) 
Following the district court's denial of his motion to suppress, Munoz 
entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving his right to appeal that denial. (R., 
p.62-63.) Consistent with that reservation, Munoz timely appeals. (R., pp.80- 
81.) 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Munoz states the issues on appeal as: 
A. Was the detective's belief that Chris [Charles Fitzerer] was 
Mr. Marsh unreasonable and the stop of the Geo therefore 
violative of the Fourth Amendment? 
B. Did the state fail to show that the search of the Geo was 
justified by an applicable exception to the warrant 
requirement? 
C. Was Mr. Munoz's admission to possessing the marijuana 
the product of a custodial interrogation without the benefit of 
Miranda warnings? 
D. Was Mr. Munoz's act of pulling the marijuana out of his 
pocket involuntary? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as follows: 
Did the district court correctly apply the law to the facts in denying Munoz's 
motion to suppress? More particularly, 
1) Has Munoz failed to meet his burden of showing that there 
was not substantial and competent evidence supporting the 
district court's determination that the detectives' belief that 
Mr. Marsh was in the vehicle was reasonable? 
2) Has Munoz failed to meet his burden of showing that there 
was not substantial and competent evidence supporting 
the district court's determination that Detective Pietrzak 
observed the marijuana in Munoz's car in plain view without 
entering the vehicle? 
3) Has Munoz failed to meet his burden of showing that there 
was not substantial and competent evidence supporting 
the district court's determination that Munoz's admissions 
were not the product of a custodial interrogation? 
4)  Has Munoz failed to meet his burden of showing that there 
was not substantial and competent evidence supporting the 
district court's determination that Munoz voluntarily 
disclosed the baggie of marijuana found in his pocket? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Correctlv Determined, Pursuant To Its Factual Findinas, That 
The Basis For Stoppino Munoz's Vehicle Was Reasonable 
A. Introduction 
Munoz claims the district court erred when it concluded that "the 
detective's belief that Chris [Charles Fitzerer] was Mr. Marsh was unreasonable" 
and, on that basis, refused to suppress Munoz's statements and disclosure of 
marijuana. (Appellant's Brief, p.4 (capitalization omitted).) Specifically, Munoz 
claims that the "facts were insufficient to create a reasonable belief that Chris 
[Fitzerer] was Mr. Marsh" and that the stop was, therefore, unjustified. Munoz 
has not met his burden of showing error. (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Munoz has 
failed to show that the district court made clearly erroneous factual 
determinations or incorrectly applied the law. The record supports the district 
court's determination that the detective had a reasonable basis for believing that 
Mr. Fitzerer was Mr. Marsh and, therefore, that the police had a reasonable basis 
for stopping the vehicle. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a ruling on a suppression motion, the appellate court defers 
to the factual findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous, but 
exercises free review of the application of constitutional principles to the facts 
found, and of whether constitutional requirements have been met. State v. 
Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 161, 15 P.3d 1157, 1169 (2000). 
C. The Record Supports The District Court's Determination That There Was 
Reasonable Articulable Suspicion For The Stop 
A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants 
and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. 
Atkinson, 128 ldaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). Under the 
Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal 
behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is 
being driven contrary to traffic laws, or if the occupants of the vehicle are, or are 
about to be, engaged in criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 41 1, 
417 (1981); State v. Flowers, 131 ldaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 
1998); see also State v. Weaver, 127 ldaho 288, 291, 900 P.2d 796, 199 (1995) 
(stopping vehicle where arrest warrant had been issued for an occupant of the 
vehicle). The reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the 
totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Ferreira, 133 ldaho 
474,483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Here, the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. Marsh, an 
individual wanted on a felony warrant, was in the vehicle. The district court 
found the "individual in the back seat of [Munoz's vehicle] looked to the police 
like a man wanted by them for felony probation violation." (R., p.51.) Nothing in 
the record contradicts this finding. Detective Pietrzak testified that he had a 
photo and physical description of Mr. Marsh (Tr., p.38, L.21 - p.39, L.6) and that 
Mr. Fitzerer passed within a few feet of him looking directly right at him (Tr., p.40, 
L.10 - p.42, L.18). The detective testified that based on the physical similarities 
between Mr. Fitzerer and Mr. Marsh, both he and Detective Sarrazolla believed 
that Mr. Fitzerer was Mr. Marsh. (Tr., p.42, ~s.19-21.)' The detectives' 
observations were bolstered by the trailer park caretaker who, after looking at the 
photo, also believed that an individual matching that description resided in the 
park. (Tr., p.39, L.?3 - p.40, L.9.) 
In response to this substantial and competent evidence, Munoz claims 
that the detectives' observations of the occupants of the car were momentary 
and that they "did not see [Fitzerer] outside the vehicle." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) 
Regardless of how short the detective's observations were or whether the 
detectives were able to observe Mr. Fitzerer's entire body, the fact remains that 
detectives observed an individual at close proximity such that they were able to 
match that individual with the physical description and picture of Mr. Marsh. 
Munoz has not shown how that perceived match was unreasonable. Below, he 
proffered no evidence showing any dissimilarities between Mr. Fitzerer and Mr. 
Marsh that would have made the detectives' observations unreasonable. 
Consequently, Munoz has not met his burden of showing that the district court's 
determination that the detective's belief that the individual in the car was Mr. 
Marsh was a clearly erroneous factual determination. 
' It is incontrovertible that law enforcement was acting in good faith on their 
belief. Even Munoz's testimony supports the fact that the detectives believed 
that Mr. Fitzererwas Mr. Marsh. (Tr., p.13, Ls.9-20.) 
I/. 
The District Court Correctly Determined. From Evidence In The Record, That 
The Marijuana In Munoz's Car Was In Plain View 
A. Introduction 
Munoz claims the search of his car was not justified by an applicable 
exception to the warrant exception. (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) More particularly, 
Munoz claims that "because Detective Pietrzak's testimony was inherently 
contradictory on key points, that testimony cannot constitute substantial, 
competent evidence in support of the district court's findings and was insufficient 
to meet the state's burden to show that the search was justified." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.5.) Munoz's claim fails. There is substantial and competent evidence 
supporting the district court's determination that the marijuana in the car was in 
plain view. Additionally, credibility determinations are reserved for the trial court 
and do not provide a basis for discounting substantial and competent evidence 
supporting the lower court's conclusions 
B. Standard Of Review 
As previously cited, on review of a ruling on a suppression motion, the 
appellate court defers to the factual findings of the trial court unless they are 
clearly erroneous, but exercises free review of the application of constitutional 
principles to the facts found, and of whether constitutional requirements have 
been met. Holland, 135 Idaho at 161, 15 P.3d at 1169. 
C. There Is Substantial And Competent Evidence Supportina The District 
Court's Determination That The Mariiuana In Munoz's Car Was Observed 
In Plain View 
For the plain view exception to the warrant requirement to apply, two 
conditions must be met; I )  there must be a lawful intrusion or the officer must 
otherwise properly be in a position to view a particular area, and 2) it must be 
immediately apparent that items viewed are contraband or evidence of a crime. 
State v. Buterbauah, 138 Idaho 96, 99, 57 P.3d 807, 810 (Ct. App. 2002). Here, 
the district court's determination that the plain view exception was applicable was 
supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
Detective Pietrzak testified that he approached the vehicle to make sure 
everybody was out of the vehicle. (Tr., p.49, Ls.17-23.) He stated that "from the 
street," he could look into the vehicle, and that he noticed, in plain view, that 
there was "a large piece of green dried marijuana" on the front passenger side 
floorboard. (Tr., p.49, L.17 - p.50, L.25.) He further testified that at that time he 
did not enter the vehicle to retrieve the contraband but returned to Mr. Fitzerer 
and then approached Munoz after Mr. Fitzerer had been arrested. (Tr., p.50, 
L.19 - p.51, L.8.) This testimony is substantial and competent evidence 
supporting the district court's determination that the marijuana was in plain view 
and, therefore, that there was no impermissible search. 
Munoz claims that this testimony cannot constitute substantial and 
competent evidence because there was a lack of clarity in Detective Pietrzak's 
preliminary hearing testimony regarding when the marijuana was removed from 
the vehicle and when police actually entered the vehicle. (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) 
This claim lacks merit for two reasons. First, it is an improper invitation to 
second guess the credibility determinations made by the district court. Second, 
even if it were appropriate to review credibility determinations on appeal, there is 
no meaningful inconsistency between Detective Pietrzak's preliminary hearing 
testimony and the testimony he provided during the suppression hearing on the 
issue of plain view. 
Credibility determinations are reserved for the district court and cannot be 
the basis for concluding that evidence in the record is not competent and 
substantial. See State v. Robertson, 134 Idaho 180, 185, 997 P.2d 641, 646 (Ct. 
App. 2000) ("This Court will not substitute its view for that of the trier of fact as to 
the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.") Munoz's claims are 
direct attacks on district court's credibility determinations regarding the testimony 
of Detective Pietrzak. It is incontrovertible that the district court was aware of the 
testimony the detective provided at the preliminary hearing. (See R., p.52, n.1.) 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding any claimed inconsistencies or lack of clarity, the 
court found Detective Pietrzak's suppression hearing account more credible. 
(R., p.51.) Pursuant to that credibility determination, the district court concluded, 
based on the detective's statements at the suppression hearing, that the 
detective's questioning of Munoz regarding the marijuana was based on what he 
observed in plain view. (R., p.52.) 
Even if credibility were an issue, a review of the testimony shows there 
was no contradiction on the question of whether the marijuana was in plain view. 
At the preliminary hearing, the detective described what was happening when he 
first noticed the marijuana: 
Well, I [Detective Pietrzak] couldn't clear the vehicle, sir. These 
conversations [regarding identity] are not taking place at the Geo. 
These conversations are taking place at the patrol car and they are 
very brief, very quick. So, after I walked up to the patrol car or up 
to the Geo, is when I saw the marijuana on the floor board. I didn't 
know who else might have been inside the car. 
(Preliminary H'rg Tr., p.22, Ls.2-9.) He then describes how he was able to see it 
-- specifically whether the marijuana was in plain view. 
Q. All right. Now, the marijuana you say you found in the 
vehicle, I believe, you said was on the floor board. 
A. The front seat floor board, yes, sir, on the passenger's side. 
Q. Are you telling me it was in a plain view? 
A. Oh, absolutely. 
(Preliminary H'rg Tr., p.28, Ls.11-18.) Although Detective Pietrzak's preliminary 
hearing testimony goes into greater detail regarding a subsequent search or 
"sweep" of the vehicle, conducted subsequent to Mr. Firzerer's arrest, the 
detective makes clear that the initial observation of the marijuana before the 
arrest and the search after the arrest were two separate events: 
I think you're lumping the two events. As far as the 
chronological order of it, I am not going to testifL that the -- that 
vehicle wasn't cleared for the entire time it took to confirm that 
warrant. 
I know that we went up and glanced, made sure there was 
no one in the car [at which time the detective first noticed the 
marijuana on the floorboard], nothing hazardous while we 
conducted our business 30 feet away or a car's length away from it. 
After Mr. Fitzerer was arrested on the warrant, the vehicle 
was searched incident to his arrest. 
(Preliminary H'rg Tr., p.27, Ls.12-23.) Thus, nothing contradicts Detective 
Pietrzak's testimony at the suppression hearing that he initial observed the 
marijuana in plain view when he first checked the vehicle to make sure that no 
one was inside.' As a result, there is no basis for arguing that the district court's 
factual determination that the evidence was in plain view, is clearly erroneous 
Ill. 
The District Court Properlv Concluded That Munoz's Admissions Were Voluntary 
And Not The Product Of Custodial Arrest 
A. Introduction 
Munoz claims the district court erred in concluding that he "was not in 
custody for purposes of Miranda at the time he was questioned about the 
marijuana." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Munoz argues that "under the 
circumstances present in this case, a person in Mr. Munoz's position would have 
understood his liberty to be restrained to a degree associated with formal arrest." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Munoz's claims are not supported. There is substantial 
evidence in the record supporting the district court's determination that Munoz's 
admissions were not the product of a custodial interrogation. 
Once Detective Pietrzak observed the marijuana in plain view he was 
authorized to enter the vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception. The well- 
established automobile exception permits police, if they have probable cause to 
believe a vehicle contains evidence of a crime, to enter the vehicle without a 
warrant and seize the evidence within. Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 3 
(1980); State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793, 800, 964 P.2d 660, 667 (1998). Thus, here, 
where evidence of a crime was in plain view, regardless of whether there was a 
basis for entering the vehicle as a search incident to arrest, Detective Pietrzak 
had a basis for entering the vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception at a 
later time because of his observation of contraband in the vehicle. 
6. Standard Of Review 
Again, because this is a review of a ruling on a suppression motion, the 
appellate court defers to the factual findings of the trial court unless they are 
clearly erroneous, but exercises free review of the application of constitutional 
principles to the facts found, and of whether constitutional requirements have 
been met. Holland, 135 Idaho at 161, 15 P.3d at 1169. 
C. Munoz Was Not In Custodv For The Purposes Of Miranda Durina The 
Time Period When Detective Pietrzak Questioned Him About The 
Mariiuana in His Car 
To safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination afforded by the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court 
held in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966), that before an 
individual is subjected to custodial interrogation, the interrogating officers must 
advise the individual of certain rights, including the right to remain silent. The 
test for determining whether an individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda is 
whether, considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation, there was a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of 
the degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 
1121, 1125 (1983). The test for determining whether an individual is in custody 
for purposes of Miranda is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation, there was a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom 
of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. 
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983). Factors to be considered by the court 
include the time and location of the interrogation, the conduct of the officers, the 
nature and manner of the questioning, and the presence of other persons. State 
v. Medrano, 123 ldaho 114, 117, 844 P.2d 1364, 1367 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. 
Albauah, 133 ldaho 587, 591, 990 P.2d 753, 757 (Ct. App. 1999). Ultimately, it 
is the defendant's burden to demonstrate that he was in custody. United States 
v. De La Fuente, 548 F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1977). 
The district court properly concluded that Munoz failed to meet this 
burden. The district court concluded that when Munoz was "informally and 
briefly" asked about the marijuana in the vehicle he "was not handcuffed and not 
under arrest." (R., p.52.) Munoz identifies nothing in the record that disputes 
these determinations. Rather, he relies solely on the proposition that the 
"coercive effects of the manner in which Mr. Munoz was ordered out of his 
vehicle undoubtedly lingered." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) 
Munoz's argument is belied by the record. Detective Pietrzak testified that 
although Munoz had been initially removed from the vehicle and handcuffed, 
once Mr. Fitzerer had been identified the handcuffs were removed and the 
nature of the stop changed. (Tr., p.51, Ls.15-21; p.58, Ls.19-23.) Munoz 
admitted that he understood that the target of the initial "high risk stop was Mr. 
Fitzerer (Mr. Marsh) and not himself (Tr., p.13, Ls.9-20) and that after the identity 
of Mr. Fitzerer was determined the handcuffs were removed (Tr., p.24, L.20 - 
p.25, L.l). Detective Pietrzak described the nature of the conversation with 
Munoz being "pretty light," open, and nonaccusatory. (Tr., p.51, L.25 - p.52, 
L.70; p.69, Ls.l-7.) Detective Pietrzak also testified that during the time he was 
speaking with Munoz the other individual involved in the stop, Munoz's wife, was 
"walking around a little bit." (Tr., p.54, Ls.2-7.) Consequently, regardless of the 
nature of the initial stop,3 that nature, as supported by record, had changed by 
the time Munoz was questioned. Accordingly, because there is substantial and 
competent evidence in the record supporting the district court's determinations, 
there is no clear error. 
IV. 
Munoz's Removal Of The Baqqie Of Mariiuana On His Person Was A Voluntary 
A 2  
A. Introduction 
Munoz claims his disclosure of the marijuana on his person was not 
voluntary but "a result of the police domination." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) 
Specifically, Munoz claims that "[tlhe overt and subtle coercive police tactics 
overbore Mr. Munoz's will and rendered the act of giving the detectives the 
marijuana out of his pocket involuntary" and that, consequently, the "state failed 
to meet its burden to show Mr. Munoz's consent was voluntary." (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.11-12.) Munoz's claims are without merit. The district court, as 
supported by substantial evidence in the record, found just the opposite. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The same standard of review cited above applies here: the appellate court 
defers to the factual findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous, 
3 Although Munoz challenges the reasonable suspicion for the initial stop, he 
does not challenge the reasonableness of the officers' belief that Mr. Marsh 
presented a sufficient threat to justify the use of handcuffs to secure the 
occupants of the car. 
but exercises free review of the application of constitutional principles to the facts 
found, and of whether constitutional requirements have been met. Holland, 135 
ldaho at 161, 15 P.3d at 1169. 
C. The Record Supports The District Court's Determination That Munoz 
Voluntarily Chose To Produce The Mariiuana 
The voluntariness of a consent to search must be determined from the 
totality of the circumstances. State v. Thorpe, 141 ldaho 151, 153, 106 P.3d 
477, 479 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 
(1973)). The standard for measuring the scope of consent under the Fourth 
Amendment is that of objective reasonableness, "what would the typical 
reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and 
the suspect." id. (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)). 
Here, the district court concluded, based on the testimony presented at 
the suppression hearing, that regardless of the initial "high r isk stop, Munoz's 
disclosure of the baggie of marijuana was a voluntary act. (R., p.52.) Munoz 
cannot meet his burden of showing how this determination was not supported by 
competent and substantial evidence in the record. As addressed in the 
preceding section, Detective Pietrzak testified that by the time he talked with 
Munoz, the nature of the stop had changed. Munoz was not under arrest, not 
handcuffed, and his wife was walking around. (Tr., p.51, Ls.15-21; p.54, Ls.2-7; 
p.58, Ls.19-23; p.13, Ls.9-20). This is substantial evidence supporting the 
district court's determination that intrusive nature of the initial stop had changed 
and that the subsequent disclosure of the baggie of marijuana was voluntary. 
Consequently, there is no basis for Munoz's claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
denying Munoz's motion to suppress and affirm Munoz's conviction. 
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